Erosion Recognition Lag
International Aspirations for Democracy vs U.S. Democratic Backsliding
The Beacon and the Siren
What happens when a beacon of freedom mutates into a siren of opportunism? In early 2026, this seemingly contradictory duality has been on striking display. On the one hand, masked federal security forces have been filmed beating and even killing U.S. residents protesting on the streets of American cities. On the other, foreign pro-democracy protesters and besieged political opposition groups abroad have called for intervention from the U.S. government in facing down brutal crackdowns by autocratic regimes in their own countries. In Iran, demonstrators in mass protests against the Islamic Republic appeared emboldened by declarations from the U.S. president that “help is on its way” and that the United States is “locked and loaded and ready to go” and “will come to their rescue”. Scores have since reportedly been killed, without any overt intervening American assistance. Similarly, in Venezuela, the leader of the political opposition, Machado, has come out publicly in support of a U.S. military operation that captured autocratic leader Maduro–even though the rest of his regime was left in place and the U.S. has made claims on Venezuelan oil. In both Iran and Venezuela, many of those striving for transitions to democratic rule have not publicly acknowledged concurrent democratic erosion in the United States, let alone drawn parallels between it and the governments of their own countries.
How is it that democracy-seekers abroad can still be calling for pro-democracy intervention from an increasingly authoritarian U.S. government? Is it realistic or reasonable for anyone to expect a government that tramples on the democratic rights of its own residents to champion those same rights internationally for foreigners? We propose that it is simultaneously understandable and unrealistic. For a number of reasons, global pro-democracy movements are likely to entertain U.S. assistance for some time before any potential consensus emerges that the U.S. is no longer a true friend to the huddled masses yearning to breathe free. As a result, we forecast there could be an unfortunate number of hopeful democrats who may unwisely tie their aspirations to a competitive authoritarian United States and inadvertently harm their own causes.
“Authoritarianism Ain’t A Problem in the United States”...
Previously, we have explored the adjustment period underway as the world gradually adapts to this new illiberal era, which has been heralded by the sharp authoritarian turn of a United States no longer sincerely interested in being the leader of the free world–or even an earnest member of it. Not least among the many factors that will determine how this adjustment period proceeds and how long it will last will be the varying degrees to which various actors perceive U.S. democratic backsliding and its impacts on the global order. Whether by simple misperception or by willful denial, many will likely cling to old assumptions about the United States for varied lengths of time as they process increasing evidence of American competitive authoritarianism. We shall call this phenomenon Erosion Recognition Lag.
…And ‘De Nile’ Ain’t a River in Egypt, Either
Erosion Recognition Lag occurs because:
The U.S. has long been known around the world as a stable and consolidated democracy, so it retains residual soft power;
It remains a military and economic superpower with the strength to overthrow foreign governments, so its hard power is undeniable; and
Despite extensive backsliding it is still the least autocratic among the Three Big Illiberals, or “3BIs”. (No one is under any delusions that the other two, Russia and China, might be democratic allies.)
As a result, there is likely to be a meaningful period of insufficient realization about authoritarian changes in U.S. governance. Similarly, there may well also be more cynical strategic calculations that the U.S. is a global power whose help can at least possibly be leveraged for democratic ends, unlike with China or Russia.
But many democratic movements or uprisings that make either of these miscalculations will likely end up disappointed as they discover the extent to which the United States may be neutral to their suffering, biased against them based on racial or ethnic animus, or even sympathetic to or corruptly cooperative with the governments oppressing them. In Venezuela, we see Machado publicly supporting stated U.S. post-Maduro policy on the country–despite the U.S. declaring it will utilize the existing regime to control Venezuela’s oil output and expressing doubt about the ability of Machado and her opposition coalition to assume national leadership and govern.
The Trap of Transactional Realism
This regrettable Venezuelan example may be an augur of future such scenarios: oppressed foreign political opposition movements that sell their soul to the U.S. government in hopes of receiving assistance in overthrowing autocratic regimes–only to be choked by the strings attached and end up discredited domestically, unable to deliver freedom at home. Or perhaps they may simply get thrown in front of the bus as the U.S. cuts a deal with their oppressive governments instead of helping force the latter from power. Notably, while the authoritarian-leaning U.S. government in its current form seems to pursue foreign relations primarily via quid pro quo, there is also evidence to suggest that its transactional approach may produce subversion of democracy abroad–say, for example, if aspiring autocrats were to intentionally align themselves with efforts by a competitive authoritarian U.S. government to promote similar democratic backsliding in their countries.
In the case of Venezuela, there may well be elements of realpolitik at play. For example, the political opposition in Venezuela may have calculated that Maduro was simply too entrenched to be ousted without foreign intervention–at least barring significant loss of life among the Venezuelan people and possibly widespread domestic instability from attempted crackdowns by the regime. Perhaps Machado concluded that without direct military support from the U.S. government, she was unlikely to be successful in forcing the Maduro regime from power. From this perspective, what could be mistaken for erosion recognition lag might actually be desperation–in effect, trying to choose the least terrible among bad options. Nevertheless, the risks of miscalculation from such decisions, especially when soliciting assistance from undemocratic actors in one’s fight for democracy, are potentially very high.
For starters, solidarity among global democracy-seekers has long been an important source of legitimacy. After all, democracy’s motivating principles of self-determination and equal dignity generally make the most sense when pursued as universal human rights. By contrast, turning a blind eye to others’ democratic struggles carries the risks of being viewed as insincere or hypocritical. In this way, Machado may have damaged–knowingly or not–perceptions of her democratic credentials in the eyes of important observers, perhaps including Americans who are pushing back against democratic erosion in the United States. Should those Americans ultimately prevail, the Venezuelan opposition might no longer be on solid footing for partnership despite otherwise being natural allies. (Recent history offers a cautionary parallel in the trajectory of Aung San Suu Kyi, whose personal sacrifices for Myanmar’s democratic aspirations originally made her a global icon. But once she gained power-sharing with her country’s military, she provided legal and rhetorical defense of its violent campaign against vulnerable domestic minority groups that is credibly documented to have included extensive atrocities. Her longtime international supporters were aghast and her global standing plummeted. Later, when the military turned on and arrested her, there were far fewer voices defending her.)
Recurring Failure of Imagination
Notwithstanding desperate or cynical strategic decisions by opposition leaders, it may also be the case that, especially among everyday Venezuelans, there is simply inadequate recognition of growing competitive authoritarian dynamics in the United States. Interestingly, polling data suggests that many Venezuelans continued to view their own country as democratic, with such opinions often more favorable than those in Latin American peer nations, for upwards of a decade after Chavez had already begun instituting significant democratic erosion. If regular people frequently struggle to detect gradual democratic backsliding at home, it does not require a large analytical leap to imagine they are likely even less well positioned to perceive it in other countries–let alone the world’s longest continuous constitutional democracy.
This same ‘failure of imagination’ that we have written about previously is compounded by the preeminent global status of the United States. That is to say, there is no true historical equivalent for the foremost democratic power in the world undergoing autocratization, which means that there isn’t really a mental model for it either. As we have seen in Iran, this can have tragic consequences. Facing brutal repression, Iranian protesters have had every reason to hope for support from any quarter. But had they more fully perceived rising authoritarianism in the United States–evidenced by security forces using violent tactics against American protesters, including documented fatal shootings of civilians on public streets–U.S. government promises of assistance may have been rightfully treated with additional skepticism. Rather than feeling heartened by statements of support by the U.S. president, the Iranian demonstrators who held signs lauding him and calling for U.S. intervention might have–absent erosion recognition lag–imagined ulterior motives and adjusted tactics accordingly.
Hegemonic Self-Sabotage
In terms of international relations, there are yet more reasons why to many it seems nonsensical that the primary architect of the postwar liberal international order would deliberately seek to demolish its own successful project. Perhaps, in a counterintuitive way, its history of misguided foreign interventions may have sown seeds of doubt among global audiences about whether they are currently witnessing such self-destruction. After all, a democratic United States has often been willing to intervene around the world in ways that have failed to live up to the country’s lofty founding ideals. Accordingly, problematic U.S. intervention may now appear to foreign populations to be just more of the same failure of democratic principles in practice, as opposed to the intentional exercise of cynical power by an increasingly authoritarian-leaning U.S. government.
Mixed Signals
Moreover, not only does long-term precedent make it challenging for people around the globe to perceive and accept the reality of American democratic erosion, but overt signs are not necessarily clear cut. To no small extent, the language of democracy has not been entirely abandoned, but instead the U.S. government now often strategically inverts democratic rhetoric in an attempt to obscure its backsliding. In addition, the political opposition within the United States largely remains committed to liberal democratic norms, which also results in some officials–particularly members of the political minority in Congress, as well as opposition party leaders from state-level governments–making at least parts of the U.S. government sound authentically democratic to outside observers.
Information Asymmetry and Erosion Recognition
Of course, global audiences are not monolithic, and availability of information about the United States varies widely depending on foreign environment. In autocratic countries like Iran and Venezuela, media is often tightly controlled, the internet may be filtered, and citizens’ access to foreign news sources is intentionally constrained. We would not expect most residents of such countries to be able to easily gain timely and credible info or assessments on domestic developments within the United States. Indeed, they might even initially dismiss reports of authoritarian changes underway in the U.S. as just typical anti-American propaganda from their regimes.
On the other hand, we might expect those culturally and linguistically closest to the U.S. to more acutely sense the political changes taking place in the United States. We see this now with Canada seeking to actively hedge against its historically close relationship with the United States. Traditional European allies to a lesser extent appear to show increased signs of alarm about rising U.S. authoritarian dynamics. But they too have incentives–such as a military and security dependence–to downplay concerns, especially (though by no means exclusively) in public.
Tread Lightly When the Beacon Flickers
Clearly, erosion recognition lag will affect various global actors differently. Among its more tragic likely manifestations will be the indeterminate amount of time where a number of uprisings against authoritarian countries may continue to look to the United States for support it would no longer feel compelled to provide out of democratic principle–but for which it may instead pursue an unseemly quid pro quo. To be sure, U.S. hard power stands to linger for long after potential further U.S. shifts towards competitive authoritarian governance–and historical perceptions of stable American democracy as a model for other countries likely will too.
Until there is widespread acceptance that the U.S. government is no longer a reliably principled democratic ally to which to turn for help in unseating autocratic regimes, precedent and persistent incentives may lead aspiring global democratic forces to misperceive stark current U.S. backsliding in ways that lead to eventual heartbreak. Those seeking democracy abroad must therefore accurately and expeditiously discern whether the glow of the Shining City on the Hill still emanates from its lights–or from a slow burn rising up from its foundations. Their democratic fates may well depend on it.
These are, indeed, illiberal times.